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Columbine 
Want to explain that 
Mike Hickey represented a typical example of an entrepreneur looking for 
venture capital. Our experience with venture capital began with a small SBIC (small 
business investment corporation) 
The Columbine Venture Fund 
The first venture fund we were involved with was made up of about six 
investors and was originally authorized by the SBA when I joined Enervest. 
Fortunately, Enervest as an authorized incorporated SBIC made several 
relatively small investments. Enervest was incorporated as an SBIC and entertained 
a few small startup companies seeking capital limited to receiving SBA matching 
funds. 
Enervest sought investors who could add capabilities in choosing potential 
About six local business personalities in the Denver area. One of their first 
investments was a real winner. He had just formed the company, had office 
southeast Denver. 
The company was formed by 2 men who were <f!S.Pera EEf?looking for capital 
A 
to help develop a device called Biox. Enervest was made up of 3 general partners 
and was about a year old when I became one of their limited partners. I can't take 
any credit for the first i:m2'successful investment. 
I\ 
The principal general partner of Enervest was Mark Kimmel who found a 
grad~~~{~fthe University of Colorado. Although I can't recall the name, one 
was a student in the graduate school at CU, and working on the side to develop a 
device that could distinguish the changes in blood oxygen content and give an early 
warning to an anesthesiologist, the status of the industry's need for the product and 
Mark Kimmel together with Sherman Muller became enamored with this proposal 
and made an early investment from the Enervest. Sitting on the board of directors as 
one of about six small business investors, it became obvious that there was 
dissention within the ~ate.organization and forced the company into a special 
4 ' 
board meeting, which would have resulted in a major discovery. Nevertheless, Mark 
Kimmel and his Vice President, Sherman Muller, followed up on the applications of 
this medical device, which~~ control never before available to the 
The two principals of Enervest made a few calls to the medical community 
tr x '' 
and suddenly discovered that this device could measure a ~a~ iH s>wgQa content 
I\ 
of the body instantaneously with a sensor clipped to the ear lobe of the patient. 
It is interesting to note that this little device with a cost~ of ten to $20, 
·I\ 
when displayed to the anesthesiology community, caused real excitement from the 
doctors aj:Pd' Biox was sold to a local company who marketed it with a dramatic 
' A 
I-~ improvement in sales over the course of the next ~years. The net revenue to the 
Enervest venture capital fund skyrocketed and almost igurieeHetely 8' rended 
" 
beyond the capability of the venture fund to keep control. btl• in't Jvrne any rn&J;.t 
fi.gelres but th0-CGmpany was ~ld-by tbQ R:afl'le Biox was purchased by a large 
venture capital fund and result~~i_n a valuable addition to the market. The product 
was an immediate success and this is the first time the anesthesiology community 
could respond to a small device with a huge potential market. 
As of this date, it is obvious that due to these two enterprising venture 
capitalists, within the next two years, the market for Biox resulted in a major 
success of a very small company. As an aside, the internal disagreemen&~~~~fl' '0 ' 
a corporate board meeting where the dissention produced a major rift in the 
company and shifted the major earnings from 
Fortunately, as a minority director attending a corporate meeting resulting in 
a third major owner of the venture fund who found his majority interest being 
threatened to the point where he needed short term capital and the only way he 
could get it was by selling shares of stock in the company. Sinec he was embi=silsd 
i.n a:Rether company with h~~~ tfiaH Ct>tltFoUing int~est, the eemt't 
In spite of the corporate disagreement, the corporate officer approached me 
to see if I would purchase some of his shares so he could clear up his account with 
another company. My interest in the company then increased substantially and a 
former principal of Enervest resigned from the company.-atm. e net effect to me 
I" 
was the ability to buy inexpensive shares from one of the officers of the company 
and I became a permanent board member of the successor fund known as, 
"Columbine Venture Fund I." 
The Columbine Venture Fund (CVF1) was organized with the addition of two 
new general partner investors. Here begins a story of forming a major venture 
capital fund, spending over $300,000 and eventually ne venture fund after 
raising new funds approximating $84 million. I 
I 
I made a commitment to the existi 
Two significant events 
institutional investors. I agreed to become general pa ner beginning in 1983 and 
terminating in 1993. When I resigned om the fund, t amount of my collateral, 
that is, all of the other venture ca~· alists in the fun which was only about five, I 
was becoming enamored with e fund. We had fiv general partner investors. The 
al partners. I agreed because I was 
anew 
artners were Terry Win rs, Mark Kimmel, Sherman Muller, 
We close the fund or I should say, the closed the fund in 1990. We officially 
closed the part ers ip demonstrating barely e ough to allow the general partners a 
return on th r investment and overall, the long term effect of CVF was that we shut 
t 
it down in.LI think- 2005, at which time I retired and happy to do so. Venture 
capital is a tough business since you have to say, "no" to prospective entrepreneurs 
100 times before you say, "yes." 
We got a lot of nice publicity and maintained a good reputation in the 
industry, some changes in the Columbine partners, but I resigned from Columbine 
venture fund with a return on capital of less than five percent. 
(l c; ce 
tr. . 
Samples of the products that we supported are attached. It turned out that 
the market for venture capital was reasonably low in 1983 and in 1993 it was 
reasonably high. I must confess I did not enjoy the role as a general partner. 
